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,t...introduction
On July 1 1990, the two postwar halves of Germany signed a treaty 
of historic proportion. Here, an agreement on monetary, economic, and 
social union came into force immediately establishing West Germany's 
"social market economy" as the norm for all Germany. Officially, the 
constituent Under, or states, of the German Democratic Republic shed the 
last vestiges of their Soviet-created structure behind the iron curtain and 
acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1990.1 With 
this, the two Germanies quickly became one in name. An enthusiastic East 
became absorbed into a more wealthy, more developed, democratic nation 
that boasted a free market economy.
Yet, today, many uncertainties still exist over this expedient move 
towards unification. When economic equality is discussed, Germans speak 
in terms of years, but when asked how long it will take to achieve "inner 
unity," they often speak in terms of generations2. Furthermore, politics, 
economics, and foreign relations continue to be topics of uncertainty for a 
united Germany. The purpose of tnis thesis is to examine and explain the 
need for a fast German unification while noting and forecasting its 
economic consequences both on a domestic and international level.
1 The Economist Intelligence Unit, fiermanv: Country Profile. (London: 
Business International Limited, 1991*92), p. 3.
2 Stephen Kinaser, The New York Times. Saturday, April 18. 1992, p. A4. col. I. 
lines 12-18,
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In order to effectively examine the economic implications of 
monetary and political reunification in Germany it is first necessary to 
gain a historical perspective. In particular, by investigating past 
economic activity in Germany one can arrive at a more informed 
conclusion as to why an expedient reunification in 1990 was necessary.
Germany is a relatively young country which emerged from a collection 
of small and medium sized states in the 19th century. According to 
Gustav Stopler, "It is a common belief that Germany owed her rapid ascent 
to the rank of the foremost industrial power on the continent of Europe to 
the founding of the Reich in 1871."3 Like the United States of America, 
the German Reich began as a loose confederation of sovereign states, and 
this status survived until the revolution of 1918.
When the Reich was founded, Germany was still divided into seven 
separate currency areas. According to Stopler, a unified currency system 
of the Reich was set up in three stages.4 (1) In 1871 a law regulating the 
minting of coins was passed. The mark was adopted as the currency unit, 
its ratio to the values of the circulating silver coinage was defined, and 
the silver coins were withdrawn. (2) In 1873 the gold standard was
3 Gustav Stopler, The German Economy: 1870 To The P iw m  (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), p. 13.
4 Ibid., p. 19.
3
4established by law, and the use of silver was reduced to small coins. (3) tn 
1875 one of the thirty-three banks of issue, the Prussian Bank, was 
reorganized as the Reichbank. Here, we see that while the Reich 
unification of currency did occur, it was a gradual process established to 
accommodate a smooth transition for its member states.
Following Germany's defeat in the first world war war and the exile 
of Kaiser Wilhelm, the Weimar Republic was founded in 1919. According 
to Karl Hardach, "inflation and weighty reparation demands principally 
accounted for the economic chaos during the first years of Weimar."5 
While a period of stabilization and prosperity did occur, by 1928 Germany 
was feeling the effects of the Great Depression triggered in the United 
States. This economic slump is often ated as one of the explanatory 
factors for the rise of fascism.6 It is here that Hitler's takeover was 
greeted with a considerable amount of relief. The November 1932 German 
elections indicate that the combined vote of the NSDAP (Nazis) and 
Communists exceeded fifty percent.7 Therefore, the rise of Hitler and the 
Third Reich in Germany was due in large part, to troubled economic times.
In the aftermath of the second world war, Germany was occupied by
5 Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in ihc Twentieth Century. 
(Bcrkcly: University of California Press, 1980), p. 38.
6 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Germany: Country Profile. (London: 
Business International Limited, 1991-92), p. 4.
7 Ibid.
the victorious powers - Britain, France, the USA and the USSR * each 
power occupying a zone of the country. The situation was much the same 
in all four occupation zones of Germany: the productive potential was 
largely destroyed, the population stricken by the direct and indirect 
effects of war, and acute material distress was widespread.8 9 According 
to EIU Country Profile, "Rising East-West tension played a major role in 
encouraging the first three countries to accelerate moves towards 
unification and granting political responsibility under their political 
control."0 On September 1, 1948, the Parliamentary Council, acting on the 
authority of the Western allies, began to draft a Basic Law. Included in 
this constitution was article twenty-nine, which allowed for eventual 
absorption of East Germany into this new unification. "In fact”, according 
to Helmut Bbhme, "the Basic Law denied East Germany's existence as a 
separate country, a move that would have serious future implications."10 
It is here that, while not officially recognized, the two Germanies split 
for all practical purposes, not to see reunification for another forty years.
In 1948 West Germany embarked on a currency reform strategy that 
has become regarded as an "economic miracle". Here is how a former
8 Reinhard Pohl, Handbook of the Economy of ihe German Democratic 
Republic. (Wcstmcad: Saxon House* 1979), p. I.
9 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Germany: Country Profile. (London: 
Business International Limited, 1991-92), p. 4.
10 Helmut BOhmc, An Introduction to the Social and Economic History of 
G erm any. (New York: St, Martin’s Press, 1978), p. 116.
governor of the American Federal Reserve described the effect of currency 
reform in West Germany in 1948:
On June 1 1948, goods reappeared in the stores, money resumed 
its normal function, black and grey markets reverted to a mi: o r role, 
foraging trips to the country ceased, labor productivity increased, an 
output took off on its great upward surge. The spirit of the country 
changed overnight. The grey, hungry, dead-looking figures wandering 
about the streets in their everlasting search for food came to life, 
as pocketing their DM40, they went on a first spending spree.11
What happened to spur this exhausted economy into a frenzy overnight?
According to Herbert Giersch, "West Germany's rapid postwar recovery
was due to hard work."12 Here, human capital was deemed more important
than physical capital. In 1948, West Germany had an ample supply of
human capital despite losses inflicted by the war. Another reason for
West Germany's turnaround was their inclusion in the Marshall Flan in
April, 1948. Here, the United States offered European countries
substantial aid on the condition that they propose a concerted plan of
reconstruction. According to Stopler, the Marshall Plan, currency re fo rm ,
and the decision in favor of a market economy were the pillars for
reconstruction in West Germany.13 * Whatever the reason or reasons, West
11 "A Survey of New Germany", The Economist. June 30. 1990. p. 10.
12 Herbert Giersch. Towards a Martel Economy in Central and Eastern Euronc. 
(Berlin: Springcr-Verlag, 1991), p. I.
13 Gustav Stopler. The German Economy; 1870 To The Present. (New York:
Harcourt, Brace k  World, Inc., 1967), p. 236.
7Germany's Great leap from central planning to a more or less free market 
is frequently cited as an example for the Central and East European 
countries waiting to transform their Soviet-type economies today.14
For East Germany, postwar economic reform pursued a different 
path. According to David Childs, "The Soviet Zone of Germany was, apart 
from the Western sections of Czechoslovakia and the former German areas 
of Poland, the first, and so far the only, advanced industrial region to 
attempt to build Soviet-style socialism."15 According to Pohl, the main 
features of this model were
a) Poftticel and economic power vested in the Communist Party; b) social 
- i.e. state m  setteetbw • ownership ef the means ef production; c) 
central pfenning, administration and supervision of the economy. 16 
Throughout G®#f MMpy economic planning was governed by the targets set 
I f f  #*d top-fevef peWicaf authorities referred to as medium term plans or 
"perspective plane*. These blueprints, covering a number of years, were m 
principle the foremost scheduling instruments, providing a solid basis 
bom which the eonoa! economic plans were to be derived.17 Therefore,
14 Holgcr Sthmieding, "Wot Germany's Economic Reforms of 1948: The 
Lessons for Central and Eastern Europe Tirday", Towards a Market Economy u. r\-inr,)l 
and Easlcrn Europe. (Berlin: Springer-Vcrlag, 1991), p 23.
15 David Childs, The OPR: Moscow's German Ally. (London: Unwin flyman.
19X8), p. 141.
16 Reinhard Pohl, Handbook of the Economy of the OermaiLJ& m oijaiit.
Republic. (Wcsimcad: Saxon House. 1979), p. 3.
the QDR embraced an economic policy of a planned command economy 
dedicated to industrial growth.
According to Childs, the GDR economy suffered numerous obstacles 
that hampered economic success.18 Apparently after the war, both the 
Americans and the Soviets wooed away key industrial GDR individuals as 
neN as stripped the East of its productive resources. Thus, the East could 
net rely on its strength in human capital as did the West in 1948. 
Furthermore, the GDR did not receive Marshall Aid. In fact, its foreign 
trade was actually hampered in that relations with Western Europe were 
virtually extinguished after 1946. Another barrier to economic success 
mentioned by Childs is the fact that many GDR industries had been and 
continued to rely on components from West Germany to assemble its 
products. One example Childs offers is the automobile industry. Before 
the war, thirty-three percent of vehicle production originated in the GDR, 
yet the same area was only responsible for only fourteen percent of the 
components. Tires, glass, spark plugs, electrical parts, and cables were 
brought from factories in the western parts of Germany. Therefore, it is 
reasonable te suggest that the German Democratic Republic did, indeed, 
suffer economic perils not experienced by its western counterpart.
Anedier point of interest in East Germany's history is its continued
i ’  mt., p. 5.
Mt David Childs. The GDR: Moscow's German Ally. (London: Unwin Hyman.
9struggle to be recognized as a separate entity, apart from West Germany. 
As mentioned earlier, West Germany's Basic Law incorporated a provision 
for East German unification (A clause that the GDR would later take them 
up on). However, according to Henry Krisch, throughout its history, the 
QDR had pursued a policy of isolation, or Abgrenzung from the West.
With the integration of the GDR into the East European 
alliance system in the mid*1950's, the regime's chief concern 
in relation to West Germany became to secure from the world, 
and especially from Bonn, an acceptance of the GDR's 
independent status.19
As the 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall is known historically for its 
prevention of immigrants from the East to the West, Childs notes that the 
Wall also became a symbol of East German isolation, independence, and 
need for recognition." In 1971, the GDR received this recognition with 
the Four Power Agreement on Berlin and the Treaty of Basic relations 
between the two German states. According to Krisch, The Four Power 
Agreement, negotiated by the United States, Great Britain, France, and the 
USSR clearly put an end to the chief instrument for political pressure in 
German affairs: the deliberate harassment of transit traffic between 
Berlin and West Germany.21 Furthermore, the agreement set the stage for
19 Henry Krisch, The German Democratic Republic: The Search For Identity. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 76. 20
20 David Childs, The GDR: Moscow's German Ally. (London: Unwin Hyman. 
1988), p. 65.
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negotiation of the first general treaty between the two German states, 
the Grundlagenvertrang of 1972. Here, for the first time, the Bonn 
government recognized the GDR as a fully sovereign state within secure 
and accepted borders. With this, the German Democratic Republic was 
successful (on paper at least) in accomplishing its policy of Abgrenzung, 
effectively carving out a timeless niche for itself in a divided European 
economy. Or so it thought.
By investigating Germany's background it is possible to more 
effectively compare the 1990 reunification of Germany. A number of 
lessons can be implemented for future reference. For one, the founding of 
the German Reich led to Germany's success in industry. Following 
political union, a gradual monetary union was implemented in a three 
phase tier. Second, the rise of the Hitler and the Third Reich was partially 
due to economic despair from Germany's defeat in World War I. Third, the 
Basic Law, drafted by the Western allies of World War II, allowed for 
eventual absorption of East Germany to the West. Fourth, as Germany 
divided, two different models of contrasting economic theory came into 
existence. Fifth, West Germany's economic recovery of 1948 has become 
an example for many Central and East European socialist countries in 
transition to a free market economy. And finally, throughout its history, 21
21 Henry Krisch, The German Democratic Republic: The Search For Idcniilv. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 76.
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east Germany has strongly fought to be recognized apart from the West.
3. Reasons for Unification
The German reunification took place in two phases. The first phase 
occurred on July 1, 1991. Here, a state treaty rushed economic union by 
transforming East Germany into a market economy thus giving it freedom 
to establish commerce with private ownership, free prices, and free 
wages.22 In effect, the East German sovereign monetary policy was 
disbanded and replaced by the West. Furthermore, on this day, the West 
German Bundesbank took monetary responsibility for both East and West 
Germany and the Deutsche mark replaced the Ostmark in East Germany. 
However, this phase did not mark the official unification of Germany.
The second phase took place on October 3, 1990. It is here that 
Germany became officially (politically) reunited after forty years of 
existing in two different political and ideological realms. Thus, five new 
Under became incorporated Into the West German Federal Republic and 
East Germany's socialist government was dissolved.
While the second phase was essential for official, democratic 
reunification, it is the ocus of this thesis to investigate the first, 
"speedy" phase of economic unification from which the second phase, 
political unification, has followed. Mr. Gary Geipel amplifies this 
reasoning. "The course of economic union will determine to a large extent
22 Serge Schmemann, The New York Times. Sunday July l, 1990, p. A6, col. 1, 
lines 5-8.
12
13
the behavior of a unified German state."23 The economic variable in 
Germany's unification equation, therefore, must be confronted.
As discussed earlier, economic union had been realized with striking 
speed: on February 7, 1990 the government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, under the auspices of Mr. Helmut Kohl, proposed that the two 
German states create a monetary union, whereby the Deutsche mark would 
become the sole legal tender of the East. On May 18, 1990 the state treaty 
on the creation of an economic union was signed by the representatives of 
the two governments. By July 1 the economic union came into effect, less 
than four months after the initial proposal was made.
The proposal to first create a monetary union reverses the order of 
events that history and economic logic would appear to impose. Referring 
back to the original founding of the Reich, political unity occurred before 
a gradual monetary union was installed. However, German reunification in 
1990 proved just the opposite. In terms of economic logic, according to 
the Economic Commission for Europe,
Monetary union would have been ideally the culmination of an 
adjustment process in the German Democratic Republic which 
would have taken place over several years, and at the end of 
which the German Democratic Republic would have significantly 
narrowed the productivity gap between it and the Federal 
Republic of Germany24.
23 Gary Gcipcl, “The Implications of German Economic Unification'', 
(Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1991), No. 123, p. I.
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This process would have started with a basic re-orientation of economic 
principles towards a market economy system, including the necessary 
legal and institutional framework, and a new independent currency. In 
such an approach the exchange rate would be expected to play the role of a 
shock absorber which via devaluation would enable price competitiveness 
to be improved during the process of removing various rigidities and other 
adjustment problems24 5. While this option for unification seemed 
reasonable, speedy monetary union, often referred to as shock therapy, 
was installed.
According to The Economist: A S u rve y  of New Germany, immediate 
economic unification occurred for four essential reasons, all of which 
merit further elaboration 26 First, the Soviet Union no longer had the will 
to sustain the East German order - the line of fear that reached back to 
the Kremlin had snapped. Second, the communist regime was shown to be 
more corrupt than most East Germans had remotely realized. Third, East 
German migration to the West put intense pressure on Bonn and made 
gradual change in East Germany almost impossible. Fourth, when Mr. 
Helmut Kohl gambled an East German election on the promise of a quick 
currency union, his alliance there won it hands down (4).
24 Economic Commission for Europe, "The Unification of Germany", Economic 
Bulletin for Europe. (New York: United Nation Press, 1991). p. 89.
25 Ibid.
26 "A Survey of New Germany”, The Economist. June 30, 1990, p. 4.
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Considering East Germany's escape from the Soviet Union's 
stronghold, one needs to look no further than Soviet leader, Mikhail 
Gorbachev's reaction or lack thereof toward East German immigration to 
the West. According to The Economist, in September of 1989 the 
government of Hungary began to gradually relax its border patrol with 
Austria.27 With this, thousands of East Germans began to use their 
relatively easy access to Hungary to gain passage to the West.
Gorbachev's reaction to this exodus was one of inaction. "This non-signal 
triggered", according to Country Profile, "mass demonstrations which 
eventually led to the symbolic and historic opening of the Berlin Wall in 
November 1989."28 In effect, the openness of Gorbachev's policies 
(glasnost) and his plans for political and economic reconstruction directly 
conflicted with the GDR's political goals resulting in a decay of a once 
tightly-held, Soviet-dominated relationship with East Germany.29
While the Soviet Union was loosening its grip on East Germany, Erich 
Honecker and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany were tightening their 
own. According to Childs, a number of political figures in the SED were 
dismissing Gorbachev's call for glasnost and instead, focusing on taking up
27 Ibid.
28 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Germany: Country Profile. (London: 
Business International Limited, 1991-92), p. 9.
29 David Childs, The GDR: Moscow's German Ally. (London: Unwin Hyman, 
1988), p. 326.
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the slack in control left by the Soviets.30 Reports received by East 
German citizens indicate that Honecker had ordered border patrol to shoot 
on sight "wall jumpers" and anyone who attempted to undermine the SED 
and its policies.31 In fact, only after Honecker was deposed from the 
Politburo, did citizens begin to fully realize the injustices Honecker and 
his regime had committed (Stasi spy reports, government perks, etc.). 
Today, the German government is attempting to extradite Honecker from 
asylum to be tried for treason.32
While soured relations with the Soviet Union and corruption from 
within East Germany's regime may help explain the need for a change, 
immigration of East German citizens to the West seems to account for the 
expedience for this economic union. As GDR's Prime Minister and 
replacement for Mr. Honecker, Egon Krenz took the historic decision to 
open the border with West Germany and the Berlin Wall in November 1989, 
immigrants were pouring into the West at a rate of 2000 per day.33
The most immediate question that needs to be answered is why East 
Germans began emigrating at such a rapid rate from their homeland?
30 Ibid., p. 327.
31 Stephen Kinzcr, The New York Times. Saturday. April 18. 1992, p. A4, col. 2. 
lines 15*20.
22 Ibid.
22 Gary Geipel, "The Implications of German Economic Unification’'. 
(Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1991), No. 123, p. 2.
AceoHflWf te ■«— — the primary reason for excessive emigration
from the Eaat mas its daeaylng command economy.34 By pursuing the 
policy of Abgwnzawf, Gm !  German industry Became isolated from western 
developments and maw or less, g ra ined from making many consumer- 
oriented economic a t technological advancements of their own.33 
According to David Chttds, while GOB publications continuously professed 
new victories in battle far industrial development, GDR citizens were
standards ware so much lower than those of 
Warn Germany.3* Therefore when Egon Krenz liberated borders, an 
©nataught of eastern citizens chose to migrate to a more wealthy, stable, 
end vibrant West Germany.
Another question that merits consideration is why West Germany 
felt it necesaaty to aeeept these immigrants from the East in the first 
piece? A t mentioned earlier, when Weet Germany drafted its Basic Law in 
t04B, it oonsidared the E M  to be •  nonparticipating partner in this 
agreement. Accordtog to Bdhme,
Par tha most part, throughout its history Wost Germany has 
attempted to maintain nationalistic ties with the las t. As tha East 
Gsrmans have continually tried to remain a separate entity, the West
34 "A Survey of New Germany". The Economist. June 30, 1990, p. 6.
p .
bjvld Childs. Hie GDR: Moscow's German Ally. (London: Unwin Hyman.
m :
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has dona just tha opposite .37
Therefore, it seems that the initial reason for acceptance of East-to-West 
migration had been a continued West German interest in preserving 
nationalism.
While Western nationalism may have been the motivating factor for 
prolonged migration in the past, in fact, it was not a surge of national 
pride that brought on the West German initiative of unification. Instead, 
it was the negative effects of excessive immigration from the East that 
forced the West to its knees begging for a solution.37 8 Economically, the 
West could not support the over 450,000 immigrants that had left the East 
since 1989.39 Westerners could simply no longer tolerate housing, 
employing, and feeding their wayward, eastern brothers.
West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl believed that only through 
immediate unification could East Germany be stabilized to a point in 
which eastern immigration could be controlled. Thus, by unifying and 
encouraging economic development in the East, Kohl believed that he could 
entice eastern citizens to remain in the East. He thus abandoned an 
earlier plan that had envisaged a step-by-step approach culminating in
37 Helmut BOhmc. An Introduction to the Social and Economic History of 
Germ any. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 99.
38 "A Survey of New Germany”, The Economist. June 30, 1990, p. 5.
39 Christopher Farrands, "Prospects for Technological Competitiveness in the 
Fine New U nder”, E1U European Trends. No. 2. 1991. p. 63.
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monetary union at the end of 1992."40 While West Germans voiced 
concerns over currency inflation and higher taxes, they were faced with a 
greater, resource-draining, immigration problem. Therefore they were 
forced to choose the lesser of two evils.41
Though East Germans saw grandiose inequality when they looked 
westward and were losing thousands of citizens daily, GOR nationalists 
had their own reservations over unification with the West. For one, during 
its forty two-year history the GOR became regarded as one of the more 
productive economies of the East European nations. By the mid 1970's, 
East Germany's GNP was twice that of Poland, one-third as much as the 
USSR and three times that of Yugoslavia.42 For the most part, 
consistencies in this differential remained until German unification.
Here, while East Germans observed economic inequalities with the West 
(shoddy consumer goods, lower wages, etc.) they were apprehensive of 
losing their economic stature in East Europe.
Another concern over economic unification expressed by East 
Germans was the possibility of unemployment. While free market 
economies of die West maintained competitiveness by permitting market 
forces to determine a rate of unemployment, in a command economy
40 "A Survey of New Germany", The Economist. June 30. 1990. p. 6.
41 Ibid.
42 David Childs, The GDR: Moscow's German Ally. (London: Unwin Hyman,
1988). p. >47.
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holding a job is an obligation to the state. Therefore, historically, 
unemployment rates in the East have been significantly lower than those 
of the West.43 Considering this, one can relate to East Germans' fears of 
unemployment in converting to a free market economy.
Another reservation expressed by East Germans was the future of its 
currency and its purchasing power in competitive western markets. GDR 
citizens realizing that their currency, the Ostmark, was worth only a 
little over half that of the West feared excessive devaluation of their 
currency.44 Therefore, while currency conversion from the Ostmark to 
the D-mark, could bring the GDR a stable currency with undeniable 
western purchasing power, it was uncertain as to what the rate of 
exchange would be if and when monetary union was to occur.
A final consideration debated by East Germans was the preservation 
of its national identity. By acceding to the West, East Germany would be 
sacrificing the individuality which it had fought for so long to achieve. In 
fact, by unifying with the West, East Germans were forced to admit the 
defeat of communism. "A command economy is an utterly hopeless way of 
running an advanced society: not even the Germans could make it work."45 
According to Farrands this forfeiture of recognition occurred with the 
1989 razing of the Berlin Wall. "The fall of the Wall represented an East
43 ibid.
44 Exchange Rate on July 1, 1990 is .60 per West German mark.
45 "A Survey of New Germany", The Economist. June 30. 1990, p. 1.
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German resignation of its once historical need for national recognition, 
and instead, represented a dire need for economic and political aid from 
the West.”46 Therefore, while the East expressed reservations over 
unification, it was more important for them to establish a path that could 
lead to equality with the West.
The political event that gave economic union of the Germanics its 
needed support was elections in the East which resulted in success for 
West German's Helmut Kohl and his policy of quick monetary union.47 In 
March of 1990, a conservative Christian Democratic alliance, led by Mr. 
Lothar de Maiziere, won the East German election. Mr. de Maiziere 
professed complete support for Mr. Kohl's ten-point economic unification 
plan which had been disclosed in late November 1990.48 Therefore, a vote 
for de Maiziere was an East German vote for economic unification. Thus, 
by popular support, East Germany elected to become one with the West.
46 Christopher Farrands, "Prospects for Technological Competitiveness in the 
Fine New Under", EIU European Trends. No. 2. 1991, p. 65.
47 "A Survey of New Germany", The Economist. June 30, 1990, p. 5.
48 Ibid.
Economic Unification1
The state treaty signed on May 18 1990 sets out the general 
principles and details for economic, monetary, and social union. As is 
stated, the two German states regarded the treaty as an intermediate step 
towards political unification.49 The date of political unification was then 
unknown. Nevertheless, by the time the unity treaty was passed by the 
two German parliaments on September 21, 1990 the legal foundations for 
economic and monetary integration of the two Germanies had already been 
laid.50 51
In a televised address on June 30, 1990, the evening before the 
surrender of East Germany's economy to West Germany, Prime Minister de 
Maiziere urged East Germans to face the "decisive step" with courage and 
hope.91 He went on to describe the monetary union as "the bridge to 
unification of the two German states."52 Indeed he was correct.
In effect, on July 1 the first state treaty in over forty years brought 
about a merging of these two ideologically opposed countries. The
49 Economic Commission for Europe, "The Unification of Germany”, Economic 
Bulletin for Europe. (New York: United Nation Press, 1991), p. 91.
50 Ibid.
51 Serge Schmcmann, The New York Times. Sunday July I, 1990, p. A6, col. I, 
lines 1-5.
52 Ibid.
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particulars of the treaty are described below:
• East Germany becomes a market economy with freedom to 
establish business with private ownership, free prices, and free wages.
• East Germany's sovereignty in monetary policy ends.
• The West German Bundesbank takes monetary responsibility for 
East and West Germany.
• The customs borders of the two Germanics moves to the countries' 
respective borders with foreign countries, creating an all-German market 
and an economic union.
• Salaries, pensions and scholarships are paid in West Germany's 
currency, the Oeutsche mark, beginning on this date.
• East Germany adapts its social system to the West German one, 
step by step, thereby creating a social union.53
Another point of interest in German economic union is the exchange 
rate that was used. In order to ease East Germans concerns over currency 
devaluation, Mr. Kohl felt it necessary to secure a favorable exchange rate 
for the East. While the Bundesbank suggested a standard rate of two 
Ostmarks for one D-mark, Kohl established a system in which each adult 
East German was allowed to exchange 4,000 marks of savings at a rate of 
one to one for West German marks.54 Children under fourteen could
53 ibid.
54 Economic Commission for Europe, "The Unification of Germany", Economic 
Bulletin for Europe. (New York: United Nation Press. 1991), p.94.
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receive only 2,000 marks, while persons over sixty could exchange up to 
6,000 at this one-for-on rate.55 This favorable rate helped gain East 
German support for monetary union with polls showing over seventy-five 
percent approval ratings from GDR citizens.56
55 ibid.
55 Serge Schmemann, The New York Times. Sunday July I. 1990. p. A6, col. 2,
lines 15-25.
Modalities of the Monetary Union: Conversion rates 
A. Bank Deposits
1. Individuals residing in the German Democratic Republic
(a) A per caput endowment, which varied with the age of the individual (cut-off date 1 
July 1990), could be converted at par:
(b) All deposits exceeding the maximum amounts above were converted at a rate of 2 
Marks against 1 Deutschmark.
2. Individuals residing outside the German Democratic Republic
Bank deposits existing on 31 December 1989 were converted at a rate of 2 Marks *  1 
DM. Any deposits created as from 1 January 1990 were converted at a rate of 3:1.
3. Legal persons and other institutions
(a) Residing in the German Democratic Republic: as 1 (b) above.
(b) Residing outside the German Democratic Republic: As for 2 above.
B. Assets and liabilities denominated in German Democratic Republic Marks
1. Basic principle: all assets and liabilities denominated in German Democratic Republic Marks
before 1 July 1990 were converted into DM, with debtors paying the creditors 1 DM for 
every 2 German Democratic Republic Marks.Bonn, 18 May 1990
2. The following liabilities and claims, however, converted at a rate of 1:1:
- wages and salaries at the levels fixed in wage agreements in force on 
1 May 1990;
* pensions which became due after 30 June 1989;
- rent, leasehold and other recurrent payments due after 30 June 1990. except for 
recurrent payments into and out of life insurance, and private old age insurance.
Souree:Antage I. Bulletin, Presse- und informationsamt der Bundesregierung. 
Bonn, 18 May 1990
Maximum amount
Aoe______
0 - 1 3  
1 4 - 5 8  
59 and above
M.Marh into DM)
2 ooo
4 000 
6 000
As discussed earlier, this de jure, or immediate monetary and social union 
provided essentially for the extension of the Federal Republic's "soziale 
Marktirtschaft" (social market economy) to the GDR, with the latter 
adopting all relevant economic, financial, and social legislation of the 
FRG. In the same vein, it was expected that socialist principles, central 
planning, and the state monopoly of foreign trade would have to be 
abandoned.57 Here, one can certainly comprehend the major adjustment 
pressure borne on the shoulders of every GDR citizen.
With this in mind, the radical changes to which the east German 
economy was subjected were accompanied by various measures designed 
to ease the adjustment pressures. According to the Economic Commission 
for Europe, these measures comprise:
- financial assistance to the public sector;
- measures to ease tensions in the labor market;
• measures to ease the structural adjustment of companies to the 
new competitive environment and to stimulate investment in general(93).
Examining the public sector, in the state treaty of May 1990 it was 
stated that the Federal Republic would make funds available to the German 
Democratic Republic to cover the larger part (about two thirds) of its 
projected deficit for the second half of 1990 and for 1991 to provide 
start-up finance for the social security system which has been brought in
57 Economic Commission for Europe. "The Unification of Germany", Economic 
Bulletin for Europe. (New York: United Nation Press, 1991), p.9l.
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line with that of the Federal Republic of Germany. The total transfer 
payments for 1991 were projected at DM 38 billion.58 However, in the 
meantime it had turned out that these projections were based on too 
optimistic assumptions about economic developments in east Germany 
after July 1.59 At the end of September 1990, the federal government 
passed a third supplementary budget largely devoted to meeting these 
larger than expected official transfer payments, which were estitnstllJ I t  
about DM50 billion for 1990. As of June 1991, the Federal government 
continued to pass new legislation for united Germany with estimates as 
high as DM75 billion for its 1991 subsidies to the East.60
To support the financing of the east German public sector budget the 
Federal Republic of Germany set up a special fund, the so-called German 
unity fund. This provides for total transfer payments of DM 115 billion up 
to 1994, of which DM 95 billion are to be raised by borrowing.61
Considering the labor market measures, as discussed earlier the 
effects of the introduction of a market economy were expected to lead to 
considerable disturbances in the east German labor market. To alleviate
58 Ibid., p. 93.
59 Ibid., p. 94.
the adjustment problems the German authorities implemented - in 
addition to the introduction of the Federal Republic's social security 
lys tffh  - revision in both the Labor Promotion Law and early retirement 
b in ifltfe .M  Under the modified Labor Adjustment Law, employees in east 
Germany who have eiporioneed a cut-back in working hours could receive 
short-time working benefits (IS percent of the previous net income) not 
only if ihert-time was caused by a temporary shortfall of orders but also 
if the cause was the fundamental restructuring of the company. Here, 
short-time benefits would be paid even if it was expected that neither the 
company nor the specific job supported would survive this new, 
competitive environment.
In terms of early retirement revisions, employees over the age of 57 
could receive early retirements for a period of up to three years. These 
benefits amounted up to 65 percent of their last average net income.63
were entitled to early retirement benefits 
Of IS  for up to a period of fifteen years if they had applied 
tSSS. This last provision was explained by the much higher 
rate that prevailed in the German Democratic 
republic m comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany and the
that a sizeable part of the adjustment burden in the eastern
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labor market would fall on female workers.64
With regards to the enterprise sector, the trust fund for the 
privatization of state assets was authorized by the unity treaty to borrow 
up to DM 25 billion in 1990-1 to support the restructuring and 
consolidation of firms in the five new Lander. According to economic 
Commission for Europe, this borrowing was supposed to be covered 
eventually by revenues from the privatization of state assets.
In fact, revenues from the sale of state assets will have to be used 
to support the structural adjustment of the former GDR economy and 
after that, to pay back, to the extent possible, the accumulated debt 
of its public sector.65
In addition to the activities of the trust fund the German authorities 
have been providing investment subsidy schemes and soft loans facilities 
to stimulate investment both by the private sector and by the local and 
regional authorities in east Germany. The total funds available amount to 
more than DM 35 billion up to 1994 66
The German authorities have also made available - outside the 
arrangements of the state and unification treaties - loans at favorable 
conditions to stimulate investment by small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the eastern Linder. A major source of these loans is the
64 ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 94
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ERP special fund, which originated in the Marshall Aid Program of 1948* 
1952.67 The "ERP loans" available for 1990 and 1991 amounted to DM 7.5 
billion and DM 6 billion respectively.
Another attempt to ease the effects of adjustment pressure was a 
short-term relaxation by the Federal Republic on sales tax for goods 
originating iri east Germany. According to the Economic Commission, this 
provision was phased out at the end of March 1991.68 By investigating 
these measures one can see that attempts were indeed made by the 
Federal Republic to help alleviate some of the adjustment burden felt in 
the East.
While primarily this event marked the absorption of the East 
economy into the West, July 1 became a date with many far reaching 
implications. In fact, this treaty opened the flood-gate for many 
unanswered questions.69 First, the "two plus four" talks involving the two 
Germanies and the four World War II allies • the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Britain, and France were assembled to establish Germany's new role 
on the political scene, including its membership in NATO. Second, it was 
uncertain as to how a departure of all foreign troops would be 
accomplished . In particular the maintenance cost of approximately
67 ibid.
68 ibid., p. 95.
69 Serge Schmemann, The New York Times. Sunday July I, 1990, p. A6, col. 3.
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380,000 Soviet troops were expected to be carried by East Germany, and 
then eventually returned after a transition period, which Germany was 
expected to finance. Third, came the question of continued trade links 
between East Germany and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, a number of 
East German companies produced goods that were important to the Soviet 
Union, but that had little value in a free market. The status of these 
companies and their continuance of Soviet trade was still undetermined at 
this point. Fourth, thousands of Vietnamese and other third world workers 
were in East Germany under contract and there future employment needed 
to be determined. Fifth, the question of whether East Germany would be 
subject to the same strict environmental regulations as those of the West 
needed to be answered. Sixth, was the important and complicated 
challenge of determining the status of property claims from previous 
owners. At the time of monetary union this was still unclear. Seventh, 
the important problem of what legal system would apply to the East was 
still being deliberated. It seemed that while much of the West German 
Constitution and most national and European Community laws would be 
extended to the East, a transitional period would exist in which East 
German laws would continue to apply. Eighth, it was unclear as to which, 
if any East German leaders, including the deposed Erich Honecker would 
have to face charges under a united German legal system. Ninth, on the 
subject of education it was still undetermined whether grades from East 
German institutions would be accepted at West German universities.
Tend), questions of establishing personal data for the East such as postal
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codes, telephone area codes, and auto registration codes was yet to be 
determined. Finally, the question of moving the nation's capital from Bonn 
back to Berlin was at the top of many politician's agendas. According to 
Schmemann, it seemed that the majority of citizens were in favor of this
move. However the costs could be expensive, possibly outweighing the 
effects it would have on domestic and foreign relations.70 Here, one can 
see that while, economic unification was the first step in uniting the 
Germanics, it certainly was not the last.
70 IWd.
5. Domestic Economic Consequences./East)
While a number of unanswered questions pose difficulty for a unified 
Germany, it is the purpose of this thesis to address issues from an 
economic standpoint. This is based on the earlier assertion that economic 
consequences have been the primary determinant for German unification.71 
In order to better comprehend these economic consequences the subject 
will be divided into three categories: domestic (east and west) • issues of 
which will be discussed in this and the following section; and 
international • issues of which will be discussed in the final section.
While criticism may be offered for Mr. Kohl's decision for quick 
economic union it may have been the most efficient way to bring the two 
Germanies together. As noted by Andreas Westphal, a fast monetary union 
was the only way to stop citizens from migrating to West Germany. 
Furthermore, this shock therapy may have been the least expensive way to 
achieve unification in the long-run, in that quick monetary union brought 
the advantage of establishing a stable money, a two tier banking system, 
and the legal system of a market economy • problems that other formerly 
planned economies had not been able to solve.72
71 Gary Gcipcl, "The implications of German Economic Unification", 
(Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1991), No. 123, p.l.
72 Andreas Westphal, "The Economic Consequences of German Unification", 
E1U Trends. No. 2, 1991, p. 38.
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However, as in any speedy process, there are many economic 
consequences that must be taken into account. By investigating these 
results, one can make a more informed decision as to whether this 
expedient unification was wise. As noted by Geipel, "Never has such a 
rapid merger been attempted between two regions with such different 
economic histories end tevels of development."73 Therefore, an
examination of this union should be beneficial in helping to understand
both its positive and negative consequences.
In spite of toe advantages of this speedy monetary union, it may be 
advantageous to recaff the arguments of the Bundesbank and those
economists in favor of a slower, more gradual strategy. According to 
Vttostphal, the main argument was that in 1989 productivity in Not 
Germany was about a quarter of that in VVeel Germany74 to ftielke Iasi 
Germany a region of united Germany - so the yvflfit wayIP pa
tantamount to too destruction of last 0»W$11 ItnfUSttf II WQMlM not be 
poeeibto tor a region of relatively low pfpM iyfty tb compete with a 
region with substantially higher productivity Within the same area, the 
exchange rata was recommandad as the instfutoant to protect last German 
industry. Mto dtis, unification could have bain bought about after the
73 Gary Gcifcf. "The faglkMims of OermM Economic Unification". 
(Indianapolis: Hudson tw iiw te. 1991). No. 12.1, p. I
74 Andreas WestphU. "Me Economic Consequences of 0$rm*R
a— a. rn . 2. t m ,  p. to.
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productivity gap between East and West Germany had been substantially 
reduced. However, this strategy, according to Westphal, would have 
encouraged export led growth in East Germany, with relatively bad terms 
of trade and the maintenance of comparatively low real inoemes in East 
Germany for quite a while.75
Although there may have been no realistic alternative to feet 
monetary union, the fears of its opponents were nearly justified by 
events. According to Westphal, "Since the beginning of the currency union 
the East German region has seen an increased regional trade defied and a 
corresponding surplus in the regional capital balance."76 Here, it is 
important to stress that n.ost of the capital inflow consisted of transfer 
payments of the federal government while private productive investment 
was very low. In 1881, while transfer payments were estimated to be 
DM38 biMkm, private enterprises were planning to invest only about DM18 
billion in east Germany.77
Unfortunately, any positive effects of these investments may have 
been counteracted by closures and layoffs in the eastern regions of 
Germany. According to Westphal, "Most of the private investment is not 
directed to new capacity, but replaces unproductive equipment with the
75 Ibid., p. 59.
75 ibid.
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most advanced West German equipment.”78 Every takeover of an East 
German enterprise (VEB) is accompanied by the elimination of enormous 
over-staffing. As a result even a sharp acceleration of private investment 
would probably not lead to an increase in the number of employees 
Therefore, it is important to consider the effects of high unemployment in 
tha former GDR.
It had been expected that unemployment would be one of the first 
immediately visible consequences of German economic union. "Open 
unemployment is a new phenomenon in east Germany where for more than 
forty years excess labor has been hidden.”79 Layoffs in the German 
Democratic Republic had begun before the economic union entered into 
force. At the end of June 1990 there were 142,000 persons unemployed.
By the end of September this figure had risen to nearly 445,000, which 
corresponds to an unemployment rate of roughly five percent.80 However, 
according to this report, a better indicator of the deterioration in the east 
German labor market is the rapidly rising number of persons working part- 
time: these numbered 1.78 million at the end of September, while in July 
1990 these came to only 0.65 million81. This steep rise has to be seen in
78 ibid.
79 Economic Commission for Europe. "The Unification of Germany". Economic
Bulletin for Europe. (New York: United Nation Press. 199i), p.98.
Vconnection with the provisions for part-time working benefits which are 
more generous than those available in the Federal Republic. Therefore, it 
is safe to say that unemployment has certainly become a consequence of 
immediate economic unification.
As discussed earlier, productivity in east Germany appears to be far 
below that of its counterpart. In fact, according to the Economic Bulletin 
for Europe, productivity is instrumental in shaping future employment in 
the East. "The extent of unemployment will largely be determined by the 
degree to which west German and foreign companies regard the German 
Democratic Republic not only as a profitable market for their products but 
also as a location for productive activities."82 83Given that east Germany is, 
on average, a low productivity region compared with the Federal Republic 
of Germany and that the exchange rate is no longer available as a policy 
instrument, much will depend on the level and expected future rate of 
change of wages in determining the price competitiveness of firms and 
the attractiveness of east Germany as a location of production.
As the question productivity in the east is a consequence of 
economic unification so too is tho problem of quality. According to a June 
30, 1990 edition of The Economist. "East Germany makes about everything 
a modern man could list - one shoddy version of each."93 Two thirds of
82 Ibid., p. 99.
83 "A Survey of New Germany", The Economist. June 30, 1990. p. 6.
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East German industry GNP was in manufacturing, energy, and mining, (West 
Germany, 35%) and one third is exported, mainly to COMECON countries 
whose unquestioning custom leaves the supplier with no idea whether his 
products are world class or no t84 Therefore, at t^e time of unification, it 
was undetermined which eastern products could compete with those of the 
west. By 1991 subsequent issues of The Economist revealed the answer to 
this uncertainty. Approximately 65 percent of all public firms will be 
disposed of in the east.85 Therefore, it seems that while many eastern 
firms may be rendered uncompetitive there are some firms that can be 
revived to compete with the west. Furthermore, many of these firms may 
continue to exist based solely on a continued demand from countries of 
Eastern Europe who have historically relied and continue to depend on 
products from the East.
Conversion of these publicly held companies to more competitive, 
privately owned companies presents particular difficulties for the East. 
Publicly owned companies came into being during the 1950's under Soviet 
supervision.
Enterprises were placed under state administration and, after 
1948, und r the German Economic Commission, whose branches 
became the industrial ministries of the new GDR government. These 
plants were designated "People's Own Enterprises" (Volkseigene, or 
VEB) and were organized into associations of enterprises (VVBs) as
84 Ibid.
85 “Hand of Kindness”. The Economist. March 21, 1992. p. 71.
39
well.86
By this time, more than half of the property in the GDR was state (or co­
op) controlled. These VEB's continued to exist at the time of economic 
unification and accounted for the majority of its economic enterprise. 
Here, a plan needed to be arrived at for conversion of these VEB's.
At the time of economic unification many speculated as to the 
convertibility of these VEB’s On June 25, Mr. Richard Pohl, the East 
German economics minister, said that his ministry had reviewed 3,000 
East German companies and found that 30 percent were capable of 
competing in the open market, 50 percent need overhauling to survive, and 
20 percent were doomed to bankruptcy. 87 Reports today tell us that even 
these estimates were optimistic.
The plan for privatization of these VEB's was to assemble the 
Treuhandanstalt, an East German agency committed to specifically aid in 
the privatization of east German public companies. Initial concerns were 
expressed at the construction of the agency in 1990. "The Treuhand is 
composed of former Communist bureaucrats interested primarily in 
maintaining their power and maximizing their gains from a shift to a 
market economy."88 However, according to the March 21, 1992 edition of
86 Economic Commission for Europe, "The Unification of Germany", Economic 
Bulletin for Europe. (New York: United Nation Press, 1991). p.92.
87 "A Survey of New Germany", The Economist. June .10, 1990, p. 12.
88 Ferdinand Prolzmsan, The New York Times. Thursday, September 20. 1990, p.
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The Economist, in less than two years this agency has put thousands of 
enterprises into private ownership, attracted billions of D-marks in new 
investment, and secured job guarantees for roughly one million workers.89 
Today, a debate exists in Germany, and elsewhere over whether the 
Treuhand's approach is the correct one.
Under the Hammer
Status of Treuhand firms as of end November 1991
no. % of total
Firms disposed of in their entirety* 4,125 38.0
Sold to the private sector 2,467 22.7
of which: sold as MBO's 602 5.5
sold to foreigners 223 2.1
Reprivatized (returned to
previous owners) 463 4.3
Transferred to local authorities 250 2.3
Being closed 636 5.8
Other (wound up through closure,
merger, or splitting up) 241 2.2
Enterprises still to be disposed of 6,744 62.0
majority owned by private sector 557 5.1
majority owned by Treuhand 6,187 56.9
Total 10,869 100.0
Source: Carlin & Mayer * Includes incomplete transactions
C17, col. 2, lines 40-50. 
89 -Hand of Kindness”, The Economist. March 21, 1992. p. 71.
The Treuhand's achievements are summarized in this table, drawn 
from a study by Colin Mayer of City University Business School and Wendy 
Carlin of University College London. By the end of November 1991, the 
Treuhand had disposed of 4,125 enterprises in various ways. A more 
recent count puts disposals to date at more than 5,000. Some 6,000 
enterprises remain to be privatized.90 This record is impressive when one 
compares the progress of restructuring attempts to those of other East 
European command economies. According to Alan Gelb, Poland and 
Yugoslavia have only just recently established public restructuring 
agencies. In 1991, Poland, which is the stronger of the two cases, had 
disposed of 120 public companies and had converted only 75.91 From th!s, 
the other East European countries in reform, as of June 1991, had not yet 
even begun to tackle this problem in earnest. Therefore, one can conclude 
that the Treuhand is, in fact, doing its job as efficiently as this 
conversion process will allow.
The major criticism of the Treuhand to date has been the heavy 
involvement and cost incurred by the agency. Carlin and Mayer, however, 
contend that such intimate intrusion into the running of the business, and 
the often heavy costs incurred by the Treuhand.
For the result is to avoid costs that otherwise would have been
90 Ibid.
9* Alan H. Gclb and Cheryl W. Gray, The Transformation of Economics in 
Central and Eastern Europe, (Washington D.C.: Tnc World Bank, I99I), p. 23
incurred - including the fiscal burden of unemployment benefits, as 
well as the broader political and social costs of an uncushioned 
collapse in the east.92
However, a oornter-aigument offered by Roger Dornbush and Holger 
Wolf of MIT suggest that the Treuhand may be spending a fortune on 
preserving industries that are by their nature obsolete. As discussed 
earlier, productivity and quality in the east historically have operated ai a 
level drastically lower than that of the West. It may be possible that the 
Treuhand is subsidizing the privatization of firms which cannot compete 
with the West. Of course, free market competition will certainly 
determine the viability of these firms in the long-run. The only real 
question it whether it is worthwhile for the Treuhand to be incurring such 
heavy costs at Germany's expense. Therefore, the Treuhand's operational 
style remains one of the outstanding issues of debate.
Unfortunately, the Treuhand is also experiencing difficulty and 
outright aggression from East European citizens. On April 1, 1991 the 
head of the Agency, Herr Rohwedder, was assassinated by a rebel faction 
in east Germany.93 "This," according to Farrands, "has only emphasized the 
sense of political insecurity which has surfaced in the east."94 In fact, it 
leads one to question why some citizens are so upset over the Treuhand's
92 “Hand of Kindness". The Economist. March 21, 1992. p. 71.
'-13 Christopher Farrands. "Prospects for Technological Competitiveness in (he
Fine New Lander", EIU European Trends. No. 2. 1991, p. 65.
94 Ibid.
1actions?
While from a broad perspective the Treuhand is making east Germany 
a more efficient market for its long run viability, in the short term, 
individuals are losing their jobs and small family businesses. While this 
pruning will certainiy make Germany a more competitive market, mc.ny 
individuals are unhappy being unemployed and are choosing to take it out 
on the Treuhand.95 Therefore, from this, one can see that while the 
privatization of VEB's is an economic effect of unification it is to this 
date uncertain whether the Treuhand's approach to privatization is of 
positive or negative consequence.
Anoihor related consequence o* unification is the need in the East 
for managers with experience and/or training in performing under a free 
market economy. According to the June 30, 1990 edition of The 
Economist. "Forty years of communism have been just long enough to kill 
off the understanding in East Germany of how enterprise works. Those 
who remember are now too old or tired to go back to it. Their young 
successors know prices, costs and balance sheets only as bureaucratic 
fictions."96 Managers in east Germany do not know how to sell things. 
They have never had to. There products were simply distributed by the 
state. Indeed, there is a great need for skilled mangers in the east.
95 Ibid., p. 66 .
96 "A Survey of New Germany”, The Economist. June .10, 1990, p. 13.
Many west German and American firms have discovered this need fcr 
capitalist knowledge in the east and are capitalizing themselves by 
opening up their facilities to the East. For example, Columbia Executive 
Programs in 1990 specifically designed a management program targeted 
to educate east German businessmen, held in Lake Como, Italy. Over 
fifteen programs were designed with east Germany in mind.97 Therefore, 
it is safe to say that the need to train managers in the East will continue 
to be an economic effect of German unification.
Economic unification allowed east Germany the opportunity to truly 
discover its uncompetitive quality and low standards of productivity in 
comparison with western standards. It is well noted that the Soviet Union 
dismantled and sent home much of East Germany's capital stock after the 
war. "But less well-known", according to The Economist, "is that East 
Germans thereafter plundered it themselves, running down its capital 
stock and ruining its environment to bridge the gap between cheap 
consumption and expensive supply."98 As discussed earlier, compared with 
the rest of the socialist bloc East Germany was regarded as one of the 
strongest economies. According to Gelb,
Post-unification research revealed that the East's economy, 
environment and infrastructure were in worse condition then the 
Communist government had led people to believe. It seemed as if the
97 Ibid., p. 7.
98 Ibid., p. 5.
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East had made no change to their country since the split in 1948.
This, unfortunately has caused estimates for the cost of unification 
to increase dramatically. Today, many expect total costs of 
unification to amount to over two trillion D-marks.39
Therefore, by researching the economic consequences of East German
neglect of its economy, infrastructure, and environment one can gain a
better sense as to why unification costs have been sorely underestimated.
Plundering of the economy has been at its most damaging in 
industry. Mr. Werner Scheer, director of the country's Special Steel 
Kombinat, based in Brandenburg, explains that East German managers could 
make no use of depreciation charges to finance investment: they had no 
"own resources."9 100 All profit after paying variable costs was sent 
straight to government as "fresh" investment. Here, central whim came 
into play. If your company was in a favored industry, such as energy, 
micro electronics or heavy machinery, you got modernized. If, like Mr. 
Harry Strohbach, the managing director of VEB Prefo, a small Dresden 
toymaker, you were ignored. "Investment? What investment? Prefo has 
not bought new equipment for over a decade."101 From this, it is possible 
to understand how productivity and quality could be low and i competitive 
with the free market economy of the West.
99 Alan H. Gclb and Cheryl W. Gray, The Transformation of Economics in 
Central and Eastern Europe, (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1991), p. 61
100 -fa Survey of New Germany", The Economist. June 30, 1990, p. 5.
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Towards the end of East Germany's history, the communist GDR 
government began to recognize its economic inequality with the West. 
Unfortunately, the German leaders pursued an uninspiring method for 
regaining their competitive edge. Led by Erich Honecker and his chief 
economic advisor, Mr. Gunter Mittag, the GDR government concentrated on 
bolstering economic productivity and quality by forcing technc.ogica! 
advancement in the east. However, according to The Economist, the GDR 
government concentrated more on pet visions than on the struggle to meet 
the needs of its people.102 Their crowning achievement was to invest 14 
billion Ostmarks during the 1980's in the development of a four-megabit 
memory chip. Robotron, the country’s badly-listing computer flagship,
Carl Zeiss of Jena, a great but struggling optical name, and the country's 
Microelectronic Kombinat were the beneficiaries of this project.
Officials from these projects now admit that it was all a waste of money. 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 many of the technical experts 
hired to advance this project left for the West to pursue more viable and 
rewarding projects. By the time of economic union production had been 
abandoned.
Here, we are provided of an example in which the GDR government, 
while recognizing a differential in productivity and quality, blatantly 
continued a project that had no viable positive economic results.
102 Ibid.
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Furthermore, we observe GDR officials making a fatal mistake: that of 
allowing an all important pool of human capital to migrate to the West.
As discussed earlier, one of the central tenets of the West German 
economic recovery in 1948 was their retention of a strong and 
enthusiastic work force. Therefore, the GDR made a poor decision in 
continuing to squelch its human and capital resources while the West has 
become more productive and quality conscious.
What can be done to sharpen east Germany's economic competitive 
edge? Almost all research institutes recommend that wage increases in 
east Germany be strictly limited to productivity increases. According to 
Westphal, this implies that wages should stimu'ate the function of an 
exchange rate.103 However, such recommendations are clearly an illusion 
Within one currency area there exists the law of one price for labor: there 
ere powerful market forces promoting the divergence of productivity 
gains and wage increases; the mobility of labor may not eliminate regional 
differences, but it is greatly reducing them.104
Therefore, it seems that wage rate policy may be a flawed 
instrument for the purposes of regional policy. The metal workers union 
(IG Metal) has already reached an agreement that by 1994 the wage
• 03 Andreas Westphal. "The Economic Consequences of German Unification". 
EIU Trends. No. 2. 1991, p. 59.
104 Ibid.
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(WkWfntial between the East and the West will be eliminated.105 It is 
mwt likely that during this time span the gap between the average 
productivity levels cannot be closed. In earlier exchanges between the 
twb countries differences in productivity could be reflected by a 
fluctuating exchange rato. However, this is impossible when the same 
currency exists in both regions. Thus, wage rate differential and its 
reconciliation with productivity will continue to be a topic of discussion 
in Germany.
Another constraint in the East with regards to unification is the 
need to rebuild infrastructure within the region. According to June 30, 
1990 edition of The Economist. "The productive services of the economy 
are thin."106 They are epitomized by a chain of shops in the villages called 
"service shops" (cleaning, mending, cobbling)- "a planner's pathetic answer 
to the intangible part of a modern economy.”107 In east Germany, it seems 
•8 if time has stood still with regard to the development of its 
infrastructure
The shortcomings of the tolephone system are striking. Only seven 
percent of households have a telephone, while in West Germany virtually 
everyone does. As of 1990, there were only a few hundred lines stretching
Ibid.
106 "a Survey of New Germany”, Thf Frnnumisi. June 30. 1990, p. 9.
107 Ibid.
outside of the country108. This is a most potent form of isolation, making 
it more or less impossible for western businessmen to arrange meetings 
in the East until they arrive. According to the June 1990 edition of the 
The Economist. 8 million telephone connections will be installed over the 
next seven years as part of the DM 55 billion job of bringing the east 
German system up to par.109
Transport also needs attention. As discussed earlier, the former 
GDR had been a command economy that had been continuously plundered. 
Some 30 percent of the rail network is single-track today because the 
Russians used trains on one track to cart away the rails from the other. 
Hitler's motorways are now fully depreciated, to put it mildly. Bouncing 
over their ruts takes the western driver back forty years to an unfenced 
dual-carriage ways, rustic effect bridges and a fellow motorist seen 
every kilometer or so in a car that makes a Beetle look futuristic.110 At 
the time of unification East German transport minister, Mr. Horst Gibtner, 
estimated that up to DM 200 billion of investment would be needed to 
restore the roads and railways, link canals to West Germany's, resurrect 
the Baltic seaports, modernize the urban roads and build a new
49
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international airport for Berlin.111
While estimates for complete infrastructure restoration a.e 
uncertain, they are certainly vast. At the time of monetary union, Geipel 
estimated a range between DM500-800 billion ($300-500 billion).112 
Unfortunately, as unification became a reality estimates increased to 
upwards of DM1 trillion.113 Regardless of cost, however, there is no 
denial that infrastructure buildup is necessary in the East and odds are 
that the gradual inflow of such measures will provide the backbone of 
East Germany's economic regeneration. Therefore, restoration of east 
Germany's infrastructure is and will continue to be a result of German 
unification.
As Germans experience difficulty estimating the cost of restoration 
of its infrastructure, they must also consider other costs of restoration 
such as the private, residential market. The housing stock in East 
Germany is decrepit. Before unification some 42 percent of it remained in 
private hands. However according to The Economist, central allocation and 
absolute rent control have had their predictable effects.114 Two-fifths of
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the housing was built before the first world war and does not appear to 
have seen a paintbrush since. In 1989, people in East Germany spent just 
three percent on their homes and it showed. Therefore, unification brings 
with it a great demand for infrastructure and residential restructuring.
Another consequence of German unification that has economic 
implications is the topic of environmental pollution in the East.
According to Krisch, 80 percent of all of east Germany's energy has been 
provided by brown coal, or lignite. Unfortunately, brown coal is one of the 
most serious environmental polluting elements.115 According to the June 
30 edition of The Economist.
In the winter months brown coal permeates the landscape. In 
addition, it (East Germany) has clung to a coal-based 
chemicals industry. The country's sulphur-dioxide figures are 
dreadful, as are the quantities of chemical water that it 
dumps into its rivers.116
According to Stanley Kabala, the intensity of pollution in a region 
can be gauged by comparing sulfur dioxide levels. West German deposits 
had reached roughly 10 tons per square kilometer annually by the middle 
of the 1980's. In contrast East Germany had average annual deposits of 35 
tons.117 Furthermore, in comparing emissions per dollar of GNP (grams)
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we see an even greater disparity: West-1; East-31. This extreme variance 
in air pollution is also present for water pollution. In fact, Germany's 
Elbe River is now known to carry effluents from the East to the Baltic, 
where they contribute to the deterioration of that sea. Therefore, this 
problem of environmental pollution in the East is not one to be taken 
lightly.
The monetary estimates for cleaning up the existing damage and 
converting east Germany to an "environmentally acceptable" country are 
astronomical. According to John Davies, cleaning up the atmosphere, 
rivers underground water, and rubbish dumps could cost DM211 billion by 
the year 2000.118 Also, one has to take into account the fact that east 
Germany may lose massive income with respect to the chemical and 
energy producing industries. "While these industries are already facing 
difficulties of entering a competitive market, they may be wiped out all 
together by environmental clean-up costs' (Farrands 64).
It has been suggested that the reasons for excessive pollution in the 
East are due to the nature of its former command economy. Kabala 
suggests that systems such as that of the former GDR contain a bias 
toward heavy and extractive industries and production processes with low 
efficiency levels in the use of energy and materials.119 This results in
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having high energy intensity levels in these economies. When this energy 
is principally derived from coal without the benefit of pollution control 
devices, as it was in the East, high levels of energy mean high levels of 
pollution. Therefore, direct investment in industrial capacity in the 
former GDR occurred at the expense of consumption, social goods, and, 
later, the environment.
A question that can be raised is why economic unification put such a 
constraint on east Germany’s environmental policy? According to The 
Economist. "The European Commission is increasingly the rule-setter for 
environmental matters in the EC, and for east Germany to even have a 
chance of assimilation into the community, they must greatly reduce 
environmental hazards in their region.”120 Also, as an enthusiastically 
"green country", west Germany has been pushing in the same direction.
The EC has already required that all east German power stations meet 
west Germany's tough standards by 1996. With political unification now a 
reality, soon all western regulations will apply to the east. Today, it is 
still uncertain as to the speed with which Euro-rules will be applied to 
east Germany and its products.121 * Nevertheless, it is clear that that 
environmental concerns are certainly a consequence of unification whose
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effects will be felt for quite a while.
A final consequence of economic unification that should be taken 
into account is the effects of further migration throughout the different 
regions of Germany. According to Stephen Kinzer more than 150,000 
refugees had arrived to the West in 1991 and 75,000 additional one's were 
expected by the year's end.122 Many of these are immigrants are from 
Vietnam, Mozambique, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. However, it is 
estimated that close to 45 percent of this number are east Germans who 
are migrating to the West. According to Westphal, "There is now no way 
to prevent a further strong migration from east to west Germany: a low 
level of relative nominal incomes leads to unemployment, resulting in 
migration as well."123 In the short run migration will reduce 
unemployment - not by creating new jobs but by depopulating many 
regions in east Germany. Westphal goes on to suggest that the probable 
result will be the prosperity of "islands of high productivity" in some 
parts of east Germany, while most of its regions will become depressed in 
economic and social terms for quite a while.124
It seems almost ironic that the immediate and primary reason for
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expedient monetary union, controlling excessive migration to the west, is 
now deemed unavoidable and acceptable. According to Ronald Asmus,
"West Germany has decided for the age-old adage, if you can't beat 'em 
than join 'em."125 However, at the time of unification West Germany 
believed that an expedient process would offer East Germans the type of 
guarantees that might stanch the flow of refugees and convince them to 
stay where they are and rebuild.126 Why is it that thousands of east 
Germans continue to migrate to the West?
As discussed earlier, the primary reason for continued migration to 
the West involves the availability of work in the West. According to John 
Davies, "The shortage of skilled workers in western Germany has been 
relieved by the influx from the east, where unemployment is growing 
rapidly."127 In effect, overmaned and uncompetitive enterprises in eastern 
Germany are shredding many workers who are taking their skills to a 
demanding West. Also, while the wage differential is becoming a 
diminishing factor, it still exists. Therefore, a number of Easterners are 
taking advantage of higher, western wages. Furthermore, according to 
Westphal, as job insecurity and shorter hours are becoming a reality in the 
east, many citizens are exercising their newly-found right of free choice
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and are opting to work in the West.
A final thought on the subject of eastern citizens migrating to the 
West also comes from Westphal. Here, he suggests that many Easterners 
are moving west for psychological reasons.128 In effect, eastern citizens 
are in the process of denying any and all facets of socialism and thus, turn 
there attention to a wealthier, more productive West. According to the 
April 4, 1992 edition of The Economist "As the Germans cry for the head 
of former deposed East German leader, Erich Honecker former GDR 
citizens find themselves abandoning a system which they had believed in 
for over forty years.'129 Here, one can observe that psychological 
implications do exist for the tens of thousands that migrate to the West 
as well as for overall unification.
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6. Domestic Economic Consequences (West)
As the East and West became one, a number of West German citizens 
expressed their discomfort with the merger. According to the June 30, 
1990 edition of The Economist. "To hear some German officials talk you 
might think that this (economic union) was a burden grudgingly shouldered 
on behalf of the West to help keep the East stable."130 In part, it was. As 
already discussed, West Germany, led by Mr. Helmut Kohl, opted for a quick 
monetary union primarily to resolve the problems of excessive 
immigration from the East. However when German leaders look a decade 
or so ahead, their eyes gleam. According to a recent poll, more than half 
of Germany's top managers and politicians believe that in the long term 
there will be bigger business opportunities in Eastern Europe than in 
Western Europe.131 By merging itself with the East, Germany has opened 
up the possibility for becoming the economic superpower of the East as 
well as the West. The purpose of this section is to discuss economic 
consequences that the West is experiencing from its economic union with 
the East.
According to the Economic Commission for Europe, "Basically, 
unification acts like an autonomous increase in external demand for the
130 Ibid., 4.
131  Ibid., 51.
Federal Republic's economy. 132 There is a large pent-up demand for 
western consumer goods in east Germany. At the same time, the creation 
of new enterprises, the restructuring of existing ones and the need for 
sizeable infrastructure investments will stimulate the demand not only 
for investment goods but also far other goods such as material 
supplies.133 Therefore, West Germany stands much to gain in its unity 
with the East.
While there are many opportunities to be seized in the East, there 
can also be much to be lost by the West. At the time of unification West 
German citizens expressed their fears that unity would result in 
excessive inflation and higher taxes. With regard to inflation, West 
Germans, realizing a considerable surge in eastern demand for western 
goods, expected an inflationary spending spree that would raise the 
already high capacity utilization rates in west German industry.134 
However, according to the Economic Commission for Europe, this has not 
occurred. In fact the average savings ratio in the East was about twice 
(13%) that of the West, where it was over six percent.135
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Why didn't inflationary spending become a factor in Germany? 
According to the Economic Commission for Europe, this can be explained 
by several factors.136 First, there was, and continues to be, a general 
uncertainty for individuals about their job security. Also, households in 
east Germany, for the first time, had been given opportunities for long­
term financial investments with attractive rates of return. This has 
tended to reduce the time preference of consumption. Another factor that 
has quelled inflationary spending in support for savings is the prospect of 
private ownership of real estate. Therefore, while expectations of 
inflationary spending were present, actions of east Germans have proved 
otherwise, thus easing west German's fears.
This newly found savings in east Germany has helped cause interest 
rates to creep up. The International Monetary Fund indicates that the 
German discount rate has jumped from 6.0 percent in 1990 to 8.0 percent 
from 1992.137 From this, one can conclude that increased savings in the 
East have indeed allowed for higher interest rates as expected in the 
West.
While west German fears of inflation went mostly unjustified, it 
seems that they were correct in their expectations of higher taxes. At the
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time of economic unification, Mr. Kohl predicted that industrial 
modernization costs would be paid in large measure by private industry 
with the government acting merely to provide tax and financing incentives 
in the East138. However, by early 1990, Chancellor Kohl appeared to waver 
on his pledge of no new taxes as his “German Unity Fund” containing 
DM115 billion ($72 billion) proved to be insufficient. As already 
discussed, the government in 1990 had been forced to bring in three 
supplementary budgets to cover rapidly rising costs associated with 
German unification and to absorb East Germany's deficit-ridden budget. 
Now it agreed on spending DM411 billion in the East for 1991, a one year 
budget growth rate of over thirty percent.139 "The only option for 
reconciliation" according to Davies, "was to increase taxes for German 
citizens."140
The tax rises agreed upon, to the citizen's dismay, included a 
special levy on income tax from July 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992 (increasing 
the tax burden by 7.5 percent during that twelve month period), plus higher 
taxes on petrol, heating, oil, gas, cigarettes and tobacco.141 Also,
138 Gary Gcipcl, "The Implications of German Economic Unification". 
(Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1991), No. 123, p3.
1 3 9  John Davies, "Germany”, The Europe Review. Vol. 6 , 1991-2. p. 72
140 Ibid., p. 73.
1 4 1  Ibid.
considerable discontent was displayed by the public over a decision to 
raise an extra DM2 billion levy a year on Bundepost Telekom's profits for 
1991 and 1992.142 However, on Mr. Kohl's intervention, the government 
found a compromise in which it would take advance payments from 
Telekom, thus averting an unpopular rise in phone bills. Regardless, a 
shortfall in the government's budgetary unification costs has certainly put 
an unexpected burden on taxpayers who are now questioning the validity of 
future government predictions for the effects of German unification.
West Germans have also experienced side-effects of monetary union 
whereby the question of property rights in the East have arisen. According 
to a West German spokesmen at the time of economic unification, "the 
more we stress that the principle of private property is vital to a working 
economy, the harder it is to ignore property claims from the past."143 
This issue is extremely complex because of the expropriations that have 
taken place over the last forty years. After the state treaty was signed on 
October 3, 1990, the two governments agreed, in a joint declaration, on 
rules and procedures that allow for either a return of property to its 
previous owners or for compensation to be paid for expropriations that 
have taken place since 1949. Expropriations which took place during the 
period 1945 to 1949 will not be undone. The reason for this being that
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during this time frame, much of this property was distributed as war 
reparations. And also, the GDR communist regime was not assembled until 
1949 and thus, could not be responsible for property that had been 
seized.144 However, the question of financial compensation for property 
taken during this period has been left open.145
The unity treaty stipulates the return of property to former owners 
as a basic right. However, according to the Economic Commission for 
Europe, there are substantial exceptions to this rule: the return of land 
and buildings is excluded if they have been turned into a public utility, 
have become part of a compound construction, or have been used for 
entrepreneurial purposes.146 in addition, it is stated that property will 
not be returned if the previous owner asserts a claim after an investment 
project has been planned. This last provision is intended to prevent 
investment projects from being hindered by unclear private property 
rights over land and real estate currently owned by the state. In all of 
these cases the former owner will receive financial compensation147.
For west Germans, this proves a complicated, yet potentially
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rewarding issue. For one, many are former east German citizens who 
immigrated to the west leaving behind property which they now wish to 
claim. According to The Economist, a recently formed East German 
Tenant's initiative claimed that, at the time of monetary union, there 
were already one million claims from West Germans wishing to regain 
their properties.148 However, citizens have found a tough going of trying 
to reclaim property that falls under investment or entrepreneurial status. 
On the flip-side, much western investment and entrepreneurial excitement 
has been quelled because of fear of forced compensation for claims on 
land in the future. According to Westphal, private investment risks are 
being avoided because land registry offices are desperately understaffed 
and land registers are for the most part in complete disorder where they 
still exist at all149. Thus, many investors are holding off until property 
rights issues are fully resolved.
Another implication of unification that receives much attention in 
the West is the German government's decline from a spending surplus to a 
deficit. In 1989, West Germany experienced a DM5.5 billion while by June 
of 1990 they were in a deficit of DM 6.8 billion.150 For the most part,
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critics have made light of this decline because it is matched by a decline 
in German net capital exports, which have meant a reduction of financial 
funds to other countries.151 However, according to Davies, "Although a 
deficit will occur in the upcoming years for Germany, an economic 
evaluation based on a cost-benefit analysis indicates that costs far 
outweigh the benefits."152 Therefore, while the transfer of real resources 
from the rest of the world to Germany does result in a budgetary spending 
deficit, the benefits of unification, such as the expansion of markets, 
additional qualified labor, and injection of additional capital warrants 
this decline in the longer run.
Another related factor of unification that has caused some concern 
is a decline in Germany's Gross National Product (GNP). In 1991, this 
output measure fell both in the second and third quarters, which according 
to the American definition means recession.153 Furthermore, it seems 
that growth is further on the decline in 1992. However, according to The 
Economist. Germany's gross domestic product has in fact, increased during 
this same time-frame by a robust 3.0 percent154. The difference between 
these two measures is as follows: GNP equals GDP plus "net factor income
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from abroad”, is. profits, investment income and workers' remittances. 
Most industrial economies now use GDP to hedge against volatile short­
term swings in international activity. The big gap between GNP and GDP in 
Germany is due to the growing number of eastern Germans who work in the 
western part (figures for all Germany not yet available), but send their 
wages to their families in the East, misleadingly depressing the GNP 
measure for the West.155 Therefore, while overall GNP should not be 
affected, individual East-West GNP's which continues to be calculated and 
used as international measures for economic status in Germany are being 
miscalculated. Thus, it is possible that while west German GNP is on the 
decline, in the aggregate, unified gross domestic product, which excludes 
foreign income from abroad is increasing.
155 ibid.
L____International Economic Consequences
While the majority of economic implications of German unification 
have been viewed from a domestic perspective, it is also necessary to 
consider economic consequences of German unification from an 
international viewpoint. Two questions are raised: What will be 
Germany's new role in East Europe?; and What will be Germany's new role 
in West Europe? By investigating these two questions it will be possible 
to gain a better understanding as to the significance of expedient 
unification in Germany.
Considering the East, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the move 
towards a market economy in other reforming countries of Eastern Europe 
presents many uncertainties for a united Germany. As east Germans 
satisfy their consumer urge for western goods, a demand for eastern 
products has obviously declined. According to the Economic Commission 
for Europe, "German consumers have turned away not only from domestic 
products but also from those imported by the CMEA (Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance). Furthermore many east German firms are finding 
material supplies and machinery at lower prices in western markets."156 
As a consequence, east German firms cancelled, on a large scale, orders 
which had been firmly contracted before the economic union came into
156 Economic Commission lor Europe, "The Unilic.uion of Germany". Econoini*■ 
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• fa c t  The stump in east German production and the prospect of 
bankruptcy for many firms atso depresses imports. The net outcome of 
these chanfe* has been an accumutation of a sizeable trade surplus with 
the CMEA since the economic union came into effect.157
In the state treaties uniting the economies of West and Fast 
Germany, the West German government pledges itself to honor the 
commitmams Of East German enterprises with trading partners in the 
CMEA. In fact, the treaty calls for the expansion of ties with the CMEA 
countries, provided that "market economic principles” are the guiding 
force158. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, many Eastern European 
countries are finding that their products are simply no longer accepted by 
east German clients. 159 Here, the elimination of central planning and the 
opening of the GDR to Western products makes it very difficult for east 
German firms to maintain either their delivery or purchase commitments.
On January 1, 1991, all German transactions with the CMEA 
countries began their denomination in hard currency. With this, the ability 
for trade with the east has become more desirable in that transactions 
can to  completed with more security. Of course, CMEA clients will not be 
in a position to pay for east German goods in hard currency, unless their
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own tales to Germany and resulting hard currency income can be 
guaranteed.1*0 Therefore, it is of great importance that a unified Germany 
recover the former GDR's historical markets.
Despite the range of problems, trade between eastern Germany and 
the CMEA countries is of considerable importance. According to 
SchOnfefd, 44 percent of East German trade involved CMEA, and 23 percent 
the Soviet Union alone.1*1
With regards to the Soviet Union, the USSR and the GDR had been 
each other's most important trading partners. In the 1910's, the GDR 
coneistpntly accounted for between 10 and 12 percent of Soviet imports 
and exports.162 In the other direction, the Soviet Union had a virtual 
monopoly on energy and raw material supplies to the GDR. Almost all oil 
and natural gas consumed in East Germany came from the USSR.163 
Although the USSR end GDR are no more, it will certainly be important for 
the two to foator relations within their new contexts. According to 
Schanfeld, "The continuation of trade with the Soviet Union and ether 
CMEA countries win no deutt ease the transition to the tree markal ter 
npfftereui east Gar men eempani»s.H1*« therefore, continued ecenomlo
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trade is essential for both the sake of Germany as well as the new 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other CMEA countries.
Here, it is believed that by working together, these former command 
economies can improve their chances of making a smooth transition to a 
free market economy.
Investigating German relations with the West, following unification, 
it is necessary to examine what Germany's new role will be in a new 
Europe. According to Hans Willgerodt, "The prospect of a united Germany 
is frightening for many countries and for some Germans as well."164 65 Aside 
from the possibilities for political and militaristic ambitions, Germany is 
on the verge of becoming an economic superpower. Therefore, it is 
without doubt that many uncertainties exist for economic concerns in the 
West.
While the Federal Republic conducted more than half of its foreign 
trade with the European Community, economic ties between East Germany 
and the EC countries (with the exception of West Germany, of course) were 
minor. According to Schdnfeld, the GDR was regarded by other EC 
countries as any other non-member "third country,’ , which meant that it 
was subject to tariffs.166 Therefore, when economic unification occurred,
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it was no doubt questionable as to how the former GDR would now be 
treated. In December 1989, the EC Commission supported West Germany's 
right to unify with East Germany without losing its status as an EC 
member.1®7 Therefore, German unification became regarded by the EC as 
simply, an enlargement of West Germany and thus, did not require the GDR 
to apply for membership.
One of the most difficult consequences of German unification is that 
the East will be required to heed all laws and regulation of the EC. 
According to The Economist, the EC Commission decided at its April 1990 
meeting to bring East Germany into the Community in three phases.167 68 The 
first phase began with Germany monetary union on July 1, 1990. In this 
phase, East Germany adopted the bulk of West German laws, which already 
conform to EC statutes. The second took place at political unification of 
the two Germanies. During the second phase, the number of east German 
exemptions from EC trade regulations was minimized. Here, the greatest 
problems have been caused in the EC's attempts to subject east Germany's 
agriculture sector, which was highly subsidized and is very 
uncompetitive, to its regulatory mechanisms.169 Also during this phase,
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other EC members have gradually phased out quotas on East German goods.
It is not until the third phase, which will occur at a yet-to-be-determined 
date, that full application of Community law and the complete integration 
of east Germany into the EC will take place. In the interim, east Germany 
has been able to draw on various EC funds to assist its restructuring and 
modernization.170 However, it has been observed that other less developed 
EC countries, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, have pointed out the 
social responsibility that the Federal Republic has for the East and have 
fought any reductions to their own assistance from the EC.
As discussed, there are many fears that have arisen in other F.C 
countries as a result Germany's expedient monetary union. According to 
Schbnfeld, "Most of these fears center on the sheer economic weight and 
resulting political dominance that Germany could have in Europe."171 
There are also concerns that Germany's economic focus will shift more to 
central and Eastern Europe, at the expense of its interest in EC 
integration. Others worry that the sheer cost of modernizing east 
Germany will limit Germany's important role as a financial contributor to 
the EC. And finally, other countries worry about Germany's increasing 
debt load and it implication for world capital markets.172
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According to Schbnfeld, it is not realistic that a united Germany 
will neglect it obligations to the European Community.
It is precisely a speedy EC integration that will strengthen the 
productivity of the German economy and ther 'fore ease the 
burden of unification. Ties to the Soviet Union and other 
eastern and southern European countries are no replacement for a 
strong relationship with the EC.173
Schonfeld goes on to suggest that the German government has made clear 
its interest in the coordination with the European integration process. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that all member countries from the EC, as 
well as all other industrial countries, can profit from trade and 
investment with the opportunities in east Germany. However, as already 
discussed, these firms have experienced some difficulties (property 
rights, capital restoration, management education, etc.) in capitalizing on 
these opportunities in the East. Therefore, while many hazards continue 
to exist for investment in east Germany, continued relations with the 
West will only foster stronger production in united Germany. While we 
have only provided an overview on the international topics that relate to 
unification in Germany, it is important to recognize that numerous 
economic implications do exist. Furthermore, it has been observed that 
the same factors which inhibit west German investment in the East also 
apply on an international level.
173 Ibid., p. 92.
8. Conclusion
While July 1, 1990 designates the date in which East and West 
Germany became economically unified, it certainly does not qualify as the 
date in which the economies became one entity. As we have demonstrated 
that German unification was expedient, it is still obvious that this union 
did not occur in one fell swoop. In fact, German unification is a process 
just as it was when original unification occurred with the founding of the 
Reich in 1918.
While both are classified as a process, there the similarity ends. 
German economic reunification in 1990 occurred in just the opposite 
manner of the Reich's founding. In 1990, monetary reunion occurred before 
political. This decision surprised many critics. However, we have proven 
that this expedient, awkward process was necessary given the conditions 
at hand.
Furthermore, we have proven that while this process was a fast one, 
it left behind a number of economic consequences affecting matters 
domestically and internationally. While these implications are numerous 
and of different degree they all have one thing in common: a need to be 
investigated. By examining these consequences it is noped that further 
attention will be given to these subjects in relation to the new unified 
Germany as well as Eastern and Central Europe which are experiencing 
growing pains in their transition to free market economies.
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